Abstract. We study a model of vendors competing to sell a homogeneous product to customers spread evenly along a linear city. This model is based on Hotelling's celebrated paper in 1929. Our aim in this paper is to present a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium. This yields a representation for the equilibrium. To achieve this, we first formulate the model mathematically. Next, we prove that the condition holds if and only if vendors are equilibrium.
Introduction
We study a model in which a linear city of length 1 on a line and customers are uniformly distributed with density 1 along this interval. We consider n vendors moving on this line. Let the location of the vendor k (k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) be x k ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ · · · ≤ x n and denote the location of n vendors (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n ) by x. Since we study the competition between vendors, we consider n ≥ 2 in particular. The price of one unit of product for each vendor is identical. Moreover, we assume the following.
If there exist l (l = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) vendors nearest to a customer, the customer purchases 1/l unit of product per unit of time from each of the l vendors respectively.
Every vendor then seeks a location to maximize his profit. We then represent the profit of vendor k per unit of time by a mathematical notation. Given a vector ξ = (ξ 1 , ξ 2 , . . . , ξ n ) ∈ [0, 1] n and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, we define a set S(ξ, y) = {j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} : |ξ j − y| = min holds for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} and x k ∈ [0, 1].
We review the known results. The present model is based on Hotelling's model in [4] . Although we consider homogeneous vendors, Hotelling did heterogeneous vendors. In [1, Chaper 10], Alonso, W. treated with the same model as our problem for two vendors. He introduced this model as the competition between two vendors of ice cream along a beach. In [3] , the model for n vendors was studied. Furthermore, Eaton, B. C. and Lipsey, R. G. investigated a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium. More precisely, they claimed that (1.i) and (1.ii) in [3, p29] if and only if n vendors are equilibrium (see also [p9] [2] ). Although this is an interesting approach from the point of mathematical view, unfortunately, it seems that (1.i) and (1.ii) are not sufficient conditions. In fact, we consider a location
Then, we find that
. Therefore, this example satisfies (1.i) and (1.ii).
Remark 1.1. In [3] , vendors in our problem are called firms and f k (x) seems to be called a market of firm k. In addition, we regard two pairs of peripheral firms in (1.ii) of [3] as firms 1, 2 and 9, 10.
On the other hand, if x 3 moves from 3/10 to 1/2, x 3 can obtain a profit 2/10 more than the original one 3/20. In addition, the definition of their terminologies seems not to be clear, such as market, peripheral, equilibrium, etc. Therefore, our goal in this paper is to formulate this model mathematically and present a revised necessary and sufficient for equilibrium.
For convenience, we set x 0 = 0, x n+1 = 1 and denote a interval [x k , x k+1 ] by I k (k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n). Then our main theorem is as follows. Theorem 1.1.
(ii) n = 3 There exits no equilibrium.
x is equilibrium, if and only if the following conditions (1.5) and (1.6) hold.
Preliminary
In this section, we prepare some lemmas and a proposition to prove our main theorem in a next section. We first consider the profit of i vendors which locate at one point. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. We consider a location x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n ) with
Proof of (ii)
Proof of (iii)
We have f k (x) = 1 i
Proof of (iv)
We have
Next, the following proposition play an important role.
Proposition 2.2. If the location of n vendors
is equilibrium, the following holds.
No more than 2 vendors can occupy a location. (2.2)
Proof. Proof of (2.1) If x 1 = 0, we show that x is not equilibrium.
(i) x 1 = 0 and x 2 = 0 We notice that f 1 (x) = 1 2
where |I| represents the length of a interval I. † AND NAOKI TSUGE ‡
(ii)
From (i)-(iii), if x 1 = 0, we have proved that x is not equilibrium. Furthermore, from the symmetry, if x n = 1, we can similarly prove that x is not equilibrium.
Proof of (2.2) We prove that x is not equilibrium, provided that i (3 ≤ i ≤ n) vendors occupy at a point. We assume that
Here we recall that we set x 0 = 0 and x n+1 = 1. Therefore there exist x l and x l+i+1 at least one respectively. We notice that x l < x k < x l+i+1 and there exists no vendor on (x l , x k ) and (x k , x l+i+1 ). Dividing this proof into four cases, we prove (2.2).
For the other case |I l | < |I l+i |, from the symmetry, we can similarly show that there exists
. Thus, if x l = x 0 and x l+i+1 = x n+1 , we can prove that x is not equilibrium.
(ii) x l = x 0 and x l+i+1 = x n+1
In this case, if
. Thus, if x l = x 0 and x l+i+1 = x n+1 , we have showed that x is not equilibrium. (iii) x l = x 0 and x l+i+1 = x n+1
From the symmetry of (ii), there exists x
Thus if x l = x 0 and x l+i+1 = x n+1 , we have showed that x is not equilibrium.
(iv) x l = x 0 and x l+i+1 = x n+1
In this case, we find
For the other case x k < 1 2 , from the symmetry, we can similarly show that there exists
. Thus, if x l = x 0 and x l+i+1 = x n+1 , we have showed that x is not equilibrium.
From (i)-(iv), we can complete the proof of (2.2).
Proof of (2.3) If x 1 < x 2 , we show that x is not equilibrium. (x 1 = 0)
. Thus x is not equilibrium. If x n−1 < x n , we can similarly prove that x is not equilibrium (x n = 1).
Finally, we compare a location after the movement of a vendor with the original one. To do this, we introduce the following notation.
For a given location of n vendors x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n ) with x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ · · · ≤ x n , we move vendor k from x k to a point in A ⊂ [0, 1]. We denote the resultant location by x k → A. We notice that x k → A represents the following vector x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n ) satisfies (1.5) and (1.6),
Lemma 2.4. If a location of n vendors x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n ) satisfies (1.5) and
Proof of Theorem 1.1
We are now position to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (i)
We prove that if x = (x 1 , x 2 ) = 1 2 , 1 2 , x is equilibrium. † AND NAOKI TSUGE ‡ Proof.
(i) We consider vendor 1. We then notice that f 1 (x) = 1 2 . For any
For any x ′ 1 ∈ 1 2 , 1 , from the symmetry of (a), we can similarly prove
(ii) Next, we consider vendor 2. For any
2 ) in a similar manner to (i). From (i) and (ii), we have showed that 1 2 , 1 2 is equilibrium.
Next, we show that x = 1 2 , 1 2 is a necessary condition for equilibrium. Therefore, we prove that if x = 1 2 , 1 2 , then x is not equilibrium.
Proof. From (2.1), when x 1 = 0 or x 2 = 1, x is not equilibrium. Therefore, we treat with the case where
We first notice that f 1 (x) = 1 2 in this case. If
, from symmetry, we can show that there exits x
From the above, we have proved that 1 2 , 1 2 is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (ii)
If n = 3, (2.2) contradicts (2.3). Therefore, we conclude that there exists no equilibrium in this case.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (iii)
Finally, we are concerned with the case where n ≥ 4.
Proof. First, it follows from Lemma 2.4 that (1.5) and (1.6) is a sufficient condition for equilibrium.
Next, we show that (1.5)-(1.6) is a necessary condition for equilibrium. Therefore, we prove that if (1.5)-(1.6) do not hold, then x is not equilibrium. Observing Proposition 2.2, we do not have to treat with the case where x 1 = 0 or x n = 1 or more than 2 vendors occupy a location. From this reason, we assume that |I 0 | > 0. We prove the following cases. (i) (a) |I 1 | = 0 (resp. |I n−1 | = 0) From (2.3) and x 1 < x 2 (resp. x n−1 < x n ), x is not equilibrium.
From the symmetry of (1)- (2), we can similarly show in the case where |I n−2 | : |I n | = 2 : 1. Thus, x is not equilibrium in the case of (b). (c) |I 1 | = |I n−1 | = 0 and |I 0 | : |I 2 | = 1 : 2 and |I n−2 | : |I n | = 2 : 1 and
(2) |I 0 | > |I n | From the symmetry, we can similarly show that there exists
, x is not equilibrium in the case of (c).
(ii) Condition (1.5) holds and condition (1.6) does not hold. † AND NAOKI TSUGE ‡ (a) (1.5) holds and
Thus, x is not equilibrium in this case. (b) (1.5) holds and |I j | ≤ 2|I 0 | and 2|I 0 | > |I k | + |I k+1 | When k = 1, 2, n−1, n, we notice that |I 1 |+|I 2 | = 2|I 0 | and |I 2 |+|I 3 | ≥ 2|I 0 |. Thus, we devote to considering 3 ≤ k ≤ n − 2. In view of (2.2), we divide (b) into the following three parts.
(1) x k−1 = x k and x k = x k+1
We notice that f k (x) = 1 2 (|I k |+|I k+1 |) < 1 2 ·2|I 0 | = |I 0 |. Setting We can prove this case in a similar manner to (2) .
From (i)-(ii), we have showed that if condition (1.5) or condition (1.6) do not hold, then x is not equilibrium.
We can complete the proof of Theorem 1.1.
